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Spinoza on Melancholy and Cheerfulness 
 
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
ABSTRACT: Spinoza’s philosophy is often celebrated for its strong anti-normative current. 
Spinoza argues, for instance, that good and bad do not indicate anything positive in things, 
and that affects are always particular to the situation in which they arise. And yet Spinoza 
argues that melancholy is “always evil,” and cheerfulness “always good,” thus 
problematizing a key metaphysical principle of his system. Turning to select sections in the 
Ethics and Theological-Political Treatise, this article offers a reading of these two 
problematic affects before connecting Spinoza to recent work on early modern melancholy 
that conceptualizes it as an ‘assemblage.’ 
 
RÉSUMÉ : La philosophie de Spinoza est souvent célébrée pour son fort courant anti-
normatif. Spinoza soutient, par exemple, que le bien et le mal n’indiquent rien de positif dans 
les choses, et que les affects sont toujours particuliers à la situation dans laquelle ils 
surviennent. Et pourtant, Spinoza soutient que la mélancolie est « toujours mauvaise » et la 
gaieté « toujours bonne », problématisant ainsi un principe métaphysique clé de son 
système. Prêtant attention à certaines sections de l’Éthique et du Traité théologico-
politique, cet article offre une lecture de ces deux affects problématiques, avant d’établir un 
lien entre Spinoza et des travaux récents sur la mélancolie aux débuts de l’époque moderne, 
qui la conceptualisent comme un « assemblage ». 
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1. Introduction 
There are two things that are puzzling regarding Spinoza’s treatment of the affects 
melancholy (melancholia) and cheerfulness (hilaritas). Firstly, Spinoza holds that, whilst all 
affects are always particular to their situation, melancholy and cheerfulness are altogether 
different and appear as good or bad without regard to circumstance. For instance, whilst 
the affect pain can be good and enhance a person’s power to strive, insofar as it takes away 
a greater evil, melancholy is “always evil” (IVP42).1 According to Spinoza, then, whilst in 
certain circumstances the affect pain can be good for an individual’s striving, there are no 
circumstances under which melancholy could ever be considered good. The reverse also 
holds for cheerfulness, which Spinoza tells us is “always good” and can under no 
circumstances lead to a diminishment in a person’s power to strive (IVP42).  
As is well known, it is central to Spinoza’s naturalistic philosophy that he denies the 
intrinsic value of things, and this includes the value of objects as much as it does the value 
of affects. Indeed, various authors place great emphasis on this aspect of Spinoza’s work, 
situating his theory of affects in a strong anti-normative current that positions affects as 
particular to the affected individual and the time and space in which they relate.2 Hence, the 
 
1 I follow the standard abbreviations for the Ethics, whereby IP12Dem denotes the Demonstration to 
Proposition 12 of Part 1 of the Ethics. Therefore, the Physical Digression after IIP13 is referenced IIPD followed 
by the specific lemma, axiom, or postulate to which the citation refers. All references to the Ethics are from 
Spinoza, Ethics, in A Spinoza reader: The Ethics and other works. 
2 See, for instance, Gatens & Lloyd (specifically, pp. 100–107), Sharp (specifically, Chapter 6), and most recently 
Lucchesse for excellent accounts of the strong anti-normative current in Spinoza’s philosophy.  
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claim that melancholy is always evil and that cheerfulness is always good should puzzle any 
reader of the Ethics. This is the first sense in which melancholy and cheerfulness appear, for 
Spinoza’s philosophy, problematic at worse and puzzling at best. 
Secondly, Spinoza’s claim that cheerfulness, and by implication its antonym 
melancholy, are “more easily conceived than observed” (IVP44Schol) sets them apart from 
the other kinds of affects in the Ethics and appears to place them in a class of their own. 
Spinoza writes at length that the perceptions of the imagination, as the first and primary 
form of knowledge, are the easiest way to accrue (inadequate) knowledge about the world, 
and to this extent all knowledge of objects or affects should be easiest to accrue through 
perception and observation rather than through active forms of reasoning. Given this, what 
does it reveal about the particularity of melancholy and cheerfulness that they are more 
easily conceived than observed? What is unique to these affects that leads Spinoza to make 
such an ambiguous claim, and why do these particular affects appear to break the standard 
epistemological rules of Spinoza’s theory of the affects? 
Drawing on relevant sections of the Ethics, this article offers a reading of these two 
problematics that surround Spinoza’s treatment of melancholy and cheerfulness. I argue 
that the normativity that Spinoza ascribes to melancholy aims only to give a name to that 
which is everywhere recognized but nowhere fixed in terms of its content and the form it 
takes. Thus, I suggest that, like his treatment of good and evil, Spinoza chooses to retain a 
normative description of melancholy and cheerfulness because it allows us to name an 
affective state that is always and everywhere recognizable, but at the same time without a 
fixed and easily representable content. This gives rise to affects that are difficult to imagine, 
understand, and represent with any adequacy, but that nevertheless must be retained in a 
vocabulary of the affects in order to give structure and direction to human life.  
 
2. The ‘Wholeness’ of Melancholy and Cheerfulness 
The history of melancholy is one of competing definitions, representations, and confusions. 
In 1621, Robert Burton composed a now famous tome on a disease that he noted was so 
frequent, and that occurred so often that few did not feel the smart of it (Burton, 1978, p. 
120). This disease, so frequent in early modern times and that affected so many that few did 
not fall under its mist, is the disease of melancholy, and the book that begins with these 
words is Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy. With his book, Burton diagnoses a condition 
as common as it was contested: melancholy was everywhere present, but nowhere agreed 
upon as to its form. The European early modern period was saturated with melancholics; 
with artistic, literary, and theatrical representations of melancholy, with astrological and 
medical explanations of melancholy, and, finally, with philosophical discussions of both the 
disease (Hippocrates) and temperament (Aristotle) of melancholy. Melancholy was so 
pervasive in early modern Europe that, as Burton wrote, few did not feel the smart of it.  
But again, melancholy’s ubiquity did not mean that it was easily identifiable, or 
without contest as to its causes and symptoms. As ever, it is William Shakespeare to whom 
we can turn in order to express the feeling of the day. This is Jacques explaining and 
detailing his own melancholy in Shakespeare’s As You Like It: 
 
I have neither the scholar’s melancholy, which is emulation; nor the 
musician’s, which is fantastical; nor the courtier’s, which is proud; nor the 
soldier’s, which is ambitious; nor the lawyer’s, which is politic; nor the 
lady’s, which is nice; nor the lover’s, which is all these; — but it is a 
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melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from 
many objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels, 
which, by often rumination, wraps me in a most humorous sadness.  
(Shakespeare, 1996, IV. I)3 
 
Jacques melancholy is his own; it does not have one cause but is extracted from 
many simples and many objects, and is a result of his various experiences that cause him to 
be wrapped in a most humorous sadness. And so, if Burton tells readers that melancholy is 
all-pervasive in early modern culture and society, Shakespeare tells us that it is equally 
confused and contested, with everyone claiming a melancholy of her own.4  
Given the ubiquity of melancholy in the early modern period, it is likely that Spinoza 
was aware of its various representations and the problems it raises as an affect in need of 
explanation. Indeed, it is possible to point to places where Spinoza himself reveals at least a 
cursory knowledge of the history of melancholy’s complex representation. For instance, in 
both the Theological Political Treatise (TTP) and the Ethics, Spinoza shows himself to be 
aware of the deeply ingrained historical and cultural connection between melancholy and 
its cure in music. In the chapter of the TTP concerned with prophecy Spinoza refers to King 
Saul’s melancholy and his attempt to ease it by the summoning of a musician (David) (TTP, 
Chapter 1, p. 22).5 This is a well-known story of the Old Testament, which has been widely 
represented in a variety of artistic forms.6 Indeed, the correlation between music and 
melancholy that Spinoza refers to in the TTP is also taken up and widely accepted in the 
historical literature on the subject. As Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl 
show, it was frequently said of those who have an illness “like King Saul’s” that they are to 
be played music as a therapy for their illness (see Klibansky, Panofsky, & Saxl, 1964, pp. 46, 
81, 291). Furthermore, in the Preface to Part IV of the Ethics, in the midst of arguing that 
good and evil refer to nothing positive in the thing they are ascribed to, Spinoza once again 
recites the historically precedent claim that music is good for one who is melancholy. These 
passages therefore suggest that Spinoza had at least a passing understanding of the 
cultural-religious explanations of melancholy and its therapeutic cure in music and the arts 
more broadly. 
And yet, despite demonstrating an awareness of melancholy’s historical relationship 
to music, Spinoza fails to take up the affect in any detail and only refers to it six times in the 
Ethics and twice in the TTP.7 Its definition is given in IIIP11Schol and then re-affirmed in 
Definition Three of the Definitions of the Affects. But most important of all these fleeting 
 
3 Jacques’ detailing and parodying of the complexity of his own melancholy in Shakespeare’s As you like it, Act 
IV Scene I. 
4 Whilst both Burton and Shakespeare are writing in an Anglophone context, the ‘epidemic’ and proliferation 
of melancholy clearly extended into mainland Europe, with Burton citing German, French, and Italian sources. 
On this, see Gowland, p. 80. 
5 References to the Theological-political treatise are from Spinoza. Citations are referenced by the chapter 
number, followed by the page number of the 2007 Israel & Silverthorne edition. 
6 See Samuel Book 1, 16: 14–23, and for visual representations of David and Saul, see Rembrandt van Rijn’s 
Saul and David (1655–1660). Likewise see the representations of music as a therapy for melancholy in plates 
67 and 70 of Klibansky, Panofsky, & Saxl. It should be noted that, whilst is no evidence that Spinoza ever met 
Rembrandt, despite living very close to him in Amsterdam, they did have a tenuous link through Menasseh ben 
Israel, and would have perhaps known of each other’s work via this mutual associate. On the Rembrandt-
Spinoza connection, see Nadler, pp. 76–79. 
7 See IIIP11Schol, IIIDef3, IV Preface, IVP35Schol, IVP42, IVP45Schol, TTP Chapter 1, p. 21, TTP Chapter 1, p. 22. 
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references is what Spinoza affirms of it and its antonym cheerfulness when defining them in 
IIIP11Schol: 
 
The affect of joy which is related to the mind and body at once I call 
pleasure or cheerfulness, and that of sadness, pain or melancholy. 
But it should be noted [NS: here] that pleasure and pain are 
ascribed to a man when one part of him is affected more than the rest, 
whereas cheerfulness and melancholy are ascribed to him when all are 
equally affected. (IIIP11Schol) 
 
In this Scholium melancholy and cheerfulness are defined at the same time as the 
primary affects of joy and sadness, and before the definitions of the other affects. By 
defining them alongside the primary affects of joy and sadness, Spinoza privileges both 
melancholy and cheerfulness, and suggests that they are indicative of a wider kind of affect 
that relate to mind and body alike. But, more importantly than this, Spinoza continues that 
not only are melancholy and cheerfulness the kinds of affect that affect both the mind and 
body, but that they also are affects that affect all the parts of an individual equally. And so, 
whilst melancholy and cheerfulness are derived like all the other affects from sadness and 
joy, respectively, they differ in the extent and scope of their affective power. Put differently, 
whilst melancholy and cheerfulness are contrasted with pain and pleasure as other types of 
affections of sadness and joy, the principal difference between melancholy and pain, 
cheerfulness and pleasure, is that, whereas pleasure and pain are affects that affect one 
part of the individual more than the rest, melancholy and cheerfulness affect all the parts of 
an individual equally.  
To this extent, pleasure and pain appear as affects that disproportionately affect, 
and their presence is always felt acutely in a particular part of the wider composite 
individual. Indeed, it could be said, following Jonathan Bennett, that these kinds of affects 
are partial affects (Bennett, 1984, p. 312). On this terminology, the affect pleasure would be 
the partial increase or decrease in the affected individual’s ability to act insofar as only one 
part of that individual alters its power.8 It follows from Bennett’s terminology that if pain 
and pleasure are partial affects, then melancholy and cheerfulness ought then to be 
referred to as whole affects, since they are of such a kind that they affect all the parts of an 
individual equally. Indeed, the presence of melancholy or cheerfulness in the affected 
individual is what might be described as an all-encompassing affect that leaves no part of 
the individual unaffected. And so, whilst Spinoza gives pain or pleasure as affects that affect 
only one part of the body and because of this acuteness leave unaffected the various other 
parts of the composite individual, melancholy and cheerfulness are altogether different and 
are explained as affects that are entirely enveloping in their affective power.  
According to Bennett’s theory of ‘partial affects,’ because an affect of pain is only 
related to one part of the individual more than the rest, then the parts of the body left 
unaffected by pain would therefore be open to different affects, such as when one is 
affected with anger over the specific pain one might feel in one’s body, or when one is 
affected with gladness whilst still being in pain. For Spinoza, then, an individual may have 
 
8 Here it should be noted that the partial affect of pleasure might either be good or bad for the whole 
individual. Hence, in IVP45, Spinoza claims that, whilst pleasure is most often a modification of the affect joy, 
and therefore an increase in an individual’s power, if it becomes “excessive,” then it will be detrimental and 
“evil” for an individual’s striving (IVP45).  
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partial affects that only affect a particular part of her, leaving the remainder of her 
constituent bodies open to entirely different and even contradictory affects. And yet, whilst 
this is true of pain and pleasure, melancholy and cheerfulness are altogether different kinds 
of affects, for in their case no part of the affected individual will be unaffected. In other 
words, when an individual is affected with either melancholy or cheerfulness, there is no 
part of the body or idea in the mind that remains unaffected by the diminution or increase 
in power that is the affect of melancholy or cheerfulness. This means that, when affected 
with melancholy or cheerfulness, there are no parts of the individual from which one might 
undergo a different affect unrelated to melancholy or cheerfulness; melancholy and 
cheerfulness are all-inclusive, and the melancholic individual will be entirely subsumed by 
melancholy’s affective power even in the face of other affects.  
Here Spinoza conforms to the historically precedent idea of melancholy as entirely 
enveloping such that all the perceptions of the melancholic are shaded with a saturnine hue 
that render the subject in a state of stasis. Some have suggested that this ‘incapacitating’ 
aspect of melancholy derives from its Aristotelean side.9 In the face of an infinity of things 
that need to be explained and ordered, so the thinker becomes overwhelmed, 
incapacitated, and powerless of further thinking that isn’t coloured with the melancholic 
posture. Indeed, Michael Camille sums this up well when he suggests that Albrecht Dürer’s 
Melancolia I, often described as the first image of the melancholic posture (see Daniel, 
2013, p. 39), depicts a “[…] winged genius incapacitated in the face of a neurotic need for 
knowledge” (Camille, 1986, p. 59). Like Aristotle before him, Dürer depicts the melancholic 
as entirely overwhelmed by a pursuit for knowledge and thus entirely enveloped in an 
affective state that permits of no other affects, and that ultimately leads to a radical stasis 
of both body and mind. 
In a different but nerveless similar vein, Jacques’ detailing of his melancholy in 
Shakespeare’s As You Like It also hints at the all-encompassing capacity of melancholy when 
he states: “[…] it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted 
from many objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels, which, by often 
rumination, wraps me in a most humorous sadness” (Shakespeare, 1996, IV. I). With this 
line, Jacques articulates his melancholy as “compounded from many simples,” “extracted 
from many objects,” and which leads him to be wrapped “in a most humorous sadness” 
(Shakespeare, 1996, IV. I). In the melancholic despair, there is no single cause or object of 
one’s melancholy, but the melancholic disposition is perpetuated from the many simples 
and many objects that one encounters in one’s day-to-day relations. In the same vein that 
Spinoza conceives of the affect melancholy as being all-encompassing, so for Jacques, 
melancholy is an affect so pervasive that all the relations one undergoes become new 
sources of one’s melancholy, leading to the individual being ‘wrapped’ in a totalizing 
sadness.  
 
9 As well as the dominant Hippocratean concept of melancholy as a disease of the body with physiological 
roots, Aristotle adds that those who are outstanding in the fields of philosophy, politics, poetry, or the arts, 
and who are “unlike the majority of people,” are those who tend towards the melancholic disposition 
(Aristotle, p. 1501). Hence, in Problem One of Book XXX of his Problems, Aristotle states: “Why is it that all 
those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry, or the arts are clearly of an atrabilious 
temperament, and some of them to such an extent as to be affected by diseases caused by black bile, as is said 
to have happened to Heracles among the heroes?” (Aristotle, pp. 1498–1499 [953a110–20]). Here Aristotle 
adds to the Hippocratean concept of melancholy as a disease of the body with physiological roots, with the 
claim that melancholy afflicts those of a certain character, nature, or temperament, thereby adding to 
melancholy’s historical representation as that which overwhelmingly afflicts the creative and the learned.  
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This all-inclusive affective capacity is the extent of melancholy as an affect, and the 
consequences for the individual who suffers it, Spinoza tells us, are great. By having all of its 
constituent parts negatively affected at once, an individual is altered in a fundamental way. 
In IVP42, Spinoza begins to explain the power of such all-inclusive affects by telling readers 
that “Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always good; melancholy, on the other hand, 
is always evil” (IVP42). Spinoza supports this claim by appealing to what happens to 
individuals when all of their constituent parts are affected with melancholy or cheerfulness 
at once. Insofar as it relates to the body, cheerfulness, Spinoza asserts, affects all the parts 
of the body equally and in this way increases the body’s power of action so that all its parts 
maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. Contrasted to this is 
melancholy, which has the contrary effect of restraining and diminishing the body’s power 
to act, and therefore negatively altering the proportion of motion and rest between an 
individual’s constituent parts (IVP42Dem). Moreover, Spinoza goes so far as to say: 
 
Melancholy […] is a sadness, which, insofar as it is related to the body, 
consists in this, that the body’s power of acting is absolutely diminished 
or restrained. And so (by P38) it is always evil. (IVP42Dem, emphasis 
added) 
 
According to Spinoza, melancholy has the effect of absolutely diminishing the body’s 
power of acting, and it is through this radical and absolute altering of the ratio of motion 
and rest between the parts of a body that makes melancholy always evil. The fact, then, 
that for Spinoza melancholy is always evil and cheerfulness is always good, whilst in certain 
circumstances pain can be good and pleasure can be bad (IVP43), demonstrates the power 
and uniqueness that Spinoza affords to the affects melancholy and cheerfulness.  
 
3. The Epistemic Status of Melancholy 
In part II of the Ethics, Spinoza introduces the three ways that we can come to attain 
knowledge about Nature. As is well known, Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge span 
imagination and opinion, reason, and what he defines as knowledge gained by intuition 
(IIP40ScholII). These three kinds of knowledge describe the ways that human beings more or 
less adequately come to understand themselves and the world. The first kind of knowledge 
that Spinoza identifies is knowledge accrued through affective encounter, through 
sensation. This affective understanding of things gives rise to knowledge about the world 
that is particular to the subject of those affects, hence Spinoza describing it in the 
vernacular as “opinion” (IIP40ScholII). This is the way that human beings most often come 
to understand the world. Even without trying, we accrue ideas about things through 
imaginative forms of knowledge, and it is for this reason that imagination is the way that 
men, “by nature” (IApp), come to have their first (inadequate) ideas regarding the order of 
things. Human beings perceive, sense, and imagine the world before they begin to actively 
reason about the world, and because of this, such knowledge is always partial and confused. 
We know through imagination before we actively come to use the power of reason, or 
intuition, and because of this, we must make a special effort to go beyond the image of the 
world we’ve developed according only to our affective encounters. Imaginative knowledge 
is, then, the easiest way to know things about the world, with a rational understanding of 
the world requiring at least an effort on the part of thinking subjects to move beyond an 
understanding of the way things affect them, to an understanding of the causal nexus within 
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which these affective encounters take place. To actively reason about things requires effort, 
and because of this, it is rare in human beings.  
With this, Spinoza sets out an order of knowledge about the world with the 
imagination being the most frequent way we come to know things about the world, 
ourselves, and the affects by which we are daily torn. And yet Spinoza nevertheless calls this 
order of things into question when he discusses cheerfulness in IVP44Schol, and once again 
distinguishes it from the other affects. To quote:  
 
Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than 
observed. For the affects by which we are daily torn are generally related 
to a part of the body which is affected more than the others. Generally, 
then, the affects are excessive, and occupy the mind in the consideration 
of only one object so much that it cannot think of others. (IVP44Schol, 
emphasis added) 
 
In this quotation, Spinoza refers only to cheerfulness, and before I develop it, I would 
like to address the objection that melancholy and cheerfulness may not have the same 
relationship of mirrored but opposite affects that joy and sadness, or pleasure and pain do. 
In other words, the question becomes: when Spinoza speaks of one, is what he says always 
true of the other?10 In both IIIP11Schol and IVP42, Spinoza offers his technical definitions of 
melancholy and cheerfulness. In IIIP11Schol, they are theorized alongside one another as 
affects that function in the same manner as joy and sadness, namely, as affects that indicate 
a particular transition to a greater or lesser power of acting. Here Spinoza is clear in his 
definition of joy and sadness as indicating the same but opposing transitions of an 
individual’s striving, and the inclusion of melancholy and cheerfulness immediately 
following these definitions suggests that he considers them in the same way. However, 
whilst joy and sadness indicate the mind’s passage to a greater or lesser perfection, 
pleasure and cheerfulness, pain and melancholy are slightly different changes to an 
individual’s power: “The affect of joy which is related to the mind and body at once I call 
pleasure or cheerfulness, and that of sadness, pain or melancholy” (IIIP11Schol). Here 
Spinoza defines pleasure at the same time as pain, and melancholy at the same time as 
cheerfulness, as opposing affects that affect both the mind and body at once. And yet, as 
previously noted, their difference lies in the way they affect the individual’s constituent 
parts, with pain and pleasure occurring when one part of an individual is affected more than 
the rest, whilst melancholy and cheerfulness occur when all the parts of both the mind and 
body are equally affected. Spinoza’s treatment of melancholy and cheerfulness as a species 
of joy and sadness, and as offering an instance of pain and pleasure when all the parts of the 
body are equally affected, strongly suggests that he thinks of these two affects as being 
related in the same manner as joy and sadness, and pleasure and pain. In addition to this, 
he continues to treat them together in IVP42 where he notes that cheerfulness is always 
good, whilst melancholy is always evil, seemingly normative claims that once again suggest 
that they are a particular class of affect that relate to one another as opposites. Given this, it 
is not a stretch to suggest that even when Spinoza takes up one without the other, such as 
in his treatment of cheerfulness in IVP44Schol, what he says about one can nevertheless 
also be said, though in reverse, about the other. To this end, when in IVP44Schol Spinoza 
 
10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this objection. 
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suggests that cheerfulness is “more easily conceived than observed,” I take this claim to be 
not only about cheerfulness, but about melancholy too. Hence, I take it that whenever 
Spinoza is talking about melancholy or cheerfulness, he is likewise talking about its other, 
except that one is related to joy and the other to sadness.  
To return to the Scholium in question, we can see that IVP44Schol’s claim that 
cheerfulness is “more easily conceived than observed” appears to contradict a basic 
principle of Spinoza’s epistemology wherein knowledge gained through imagination is the 
easiest way to accrue knowledge about the world. Nonetheless, Spinoza begins to offer an 
explanation of it by way of another claim demonstrated earlier, namely, that the “general 
affects” by which we are “daily torn” are those that relate to one part of the body more 
than the others, and that cause the mind to be occupied “in the consideration of only one 
object so much so that it cannot think of others” (IVP44Schol). Here Spinoza is arguing that 
the ‘partial affects’ occupy the mind with only a single image of the perceived cause of that 
affect. Hence, Spinoza continues that the general affect of greed is easily perceived, and 
hence occupies the mind excessively in this singular perception, because it has but a single 
object and therefore an easily determinable cause: the idea of money (IVP44Schol). Contrary 
to these general kinds of affects, melancholy’s ubiquity means that it is very difficult to 
determine its origin to a single cause or object, and because of this is very difficult to 
perceive. Here, Spinoza suggests that, whilst the mind is occupied with the consideration of 
only one kind of object when its body is affected with pain, the mind is conversely occupied 
in the consideration of many kinds of objects when it is affected with melancholy or 
cheerfulness. In other words, in the melancholic state, the mind is not, as with the general 
and partial affects, occupied by the image of only one body that is seen as the affect’s 
cause, but is rather besieged by many different bodies each of which contribute to the all-
encompassing melancholic disposition. And this goes some way to explaining Spinoza’s 
puzzling claim that melancholy and cheerfulness are more easily conceived than perceived: 
the multiplicity of bodies involved in the perception of the affect melancholy means that the 
imagination simply struggles to perceive the distinct causal instances of the origin of the 
affect of melancholy.  
The claim that the multiplicity of causes involved in the affect melancholy (and 
cheerfulness) renders it difficult for the imagination to observe can be explained more 
clearly if, firstly, the reader takes Spinoza’s contrast of conception and observation to be 
equally a contrast of intellect and imagination, and secondly, if we turn to what Spinoza 
asserts of the imagination’s power, or lack of power, in his thesis on universals in 
IIP40Schol1. In IIP40Schol1, Spinoza explains the existence of universals by appealing to the 
limitation of the body and the limitation of its idea, the mind. Because the body is finite and 
the imagination’s power is correspondingly limited, an individual is capable of forming 
distinctly only a certain number of images at any one time. When the number of images a 
human being can form at once is surpassed, the imagination fails to distinguish between the 
individual bodies consequently rendering them under a single, universal determination such 
as Man or Dog. According to Spinoza, the power to form distinctly the causes of the images 
one is affected with is surpassed when the affected individual is overloaded with 
perceptions. The idea I have of ‘Man’ is formed because I am unable to consolidate each 
image of each man that is impressed upon my body by my various experiences of individual 
men; I simply have undergone too many experiences of individual men and my power to 
recall the image of each of them is not great enough. By contrasting melancholy to the 
‘general affects’ that occupy the mind with the image of only one object, Spinoza is 
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suggesting that melancholy’s cause is located in many distinct external objects, and that, in 
the melancholic state, the mind is overloaded in the consideration of these many different 
images. In this way, the affect melancholy is difficult to perceive because of the 
imagination’s limited power to consolidate the multiplicity of heterogeneous causes that 
give rise to it. And so melancholy will be difficult to perceive precisely because individuals 
lack the perceptive power to consolidate the multiple causes of melancholy into a universal 
image that stands in for each of the images that give rise to it. 
Likewise, this is also why melancholy is more easily conceived via the intellect, for 
the power of reason does what the power of imagination fails to do: reason is able to 
consolidate melancholy’s complex causal origins and determine it as the affect melancholy. 
In this case, when one tries to imagine melancholy, one fails to grasp it in any adequacy, for 
it can entail so many divergent causes that any form through which it might be represented 
ultimately fails to capture its composite nature. And so it is possible to see why, by nature of 
its implication in many bodies at once — both internal to the affected body (IIIP11Schol) and 
external (IVP44Schol) — melancholy is more easily conceived than observed, for the 
imagination simply struggles to attain the power it requires so as to consolidate its diverse 
multiple causes into a single determinable subject, namely, melancholy.  
For Spinoza, melancholy is always implicated in many external bodies at the same 
time and it will constantly shift in response to the affected individual’s changing milieu. 
Because melancholy is entirely enveloping, the melancholic perpetually turns each of the 
bodies she has relations with into a new source of her melancholy therefore perpetually re-
drawing the boundaries of her own, specific melancholy. In this way, Spinoza’s idea of 
melancholy as particularly enveloping and difficult to perceive fits with the historical 
understanding of melancholy as an affliction with diverse and variable sources, and whose 
cause is hard to trace to a singular thing.11 As the melancholic encounters new bodies, their 
particular melancholy, as Jacques puts it in As You Like It, will mutate along with their 
continually changing environment. 
Melancholy and cheerfulness are, then, a kind of affect that is involved in many 
varying bodies both internal and external to the individual. In this sense, it is possible to 
suggest that melancholy and cheerfulness are, for Spinoza, uniquely powerful affects and as 
such require a particularly complex process of understanding to be able to determine 
anything about them with any adequacy.  
 
4. Melancholy and Cheerfulness: Normative Affects? 
But whilst melancholy and cheerfulness might be particularly unique kinds of affects in 
virtue of their multifaceted composition and related ability to affect all the parts of an 
individual at once, Spinoza’s discussion of them doesn’t serve to fully explain his claim that 
melancholy is “always evil” and cheerfulness is “always good” (IVP42). According to Michael 
Lebuffe, Spinoza’s lack of discussion of melancholy and its antonym cheerfulness provides a 
real problem for his overall ethical theory because he appears to give them the status of 
affects that have an objective value (Lebuffe, 2009, pp. 216–218). Put differently, Spinoza 
holds that melancholy and cheerfulness are affects that are bad or good in themselves, 
 
11 Indeed, this idea of melancholy resonates with Freud’s explanation of the melancholic disposition in his 
essay, Mourning and melancholia. For Freud, mourning is a grief that comes with a determinable cause, and is 
thus normal and healthy, whereas melancholy is a feeling of grief the cause of which one cannot identify or 
comprehend. To this end, melancholy is, for Freud, a condition without a single determinable cause, and is 
thus pathological. On this, see Freud. 
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which flies in the face of the anti-normative current that is often said to guide his entire 
philosophy.  
The absence and hostility to normativity in Spinoza’s philosophy is often attributed 
to his denial of any and all forms of teleology, which in turn is a consequence of the 
immanent ontology that grounds his philosophy. For Spinoza, there is no end set before 
Nature, and there are no ends in Nature, for there is nothing external to Nature that could 
imbue it with a direction, and nothing in Nature that is not subject to necessity. In a recent 
article, Filippo del Lucchese stakes out the debate concerning Spinoza’s treatment of 
teleology in an attempt to return the problem to its most basic constituents. Lucchese 
argues that recent Anglophone readers have imbued Spinoza’s philosophy with an element 
of teleology that threatens the radicalism and originality of his anti-normative position 
(Lucchese, 2020, p. 149). He argues that, whilst Spinoza makes explicit his denial of all forms 
of teleology in the Appendix to Part One of the Ethics, commentators have sought to return 
it to Spinoza’s system not at the metaphysical level, but at the level of moral psychology. 
Thus, commentators such as Edwin Curley maintain that, whilst Spinoza denies all forms of 
teleology in the metaphysical order of Nature, the human or ethical realm cannot be 
disconnected from teleology, for human action is bound up with a consideration of the 
future, a future that is seen to drive action in the form of a final cause. It is along these lines, 
Lucchese argues, that teleology is often introduced back into Spinoza’s philosophy: 
 
People form opinions about the future using their imagination, evaluate 
the possible consequences of their actions using their reason, desire what 
they do not possess yet, fear what they perceive as a threat, etc. In a 
word, humans think about and are thus affected by the idea of the 
future: for many scholars, this is already teleology. (Lucchese, 2020, p. 
150) 
 
According to Lucchese, because Spinoza took seriously the extent to which humans 
think about the future, and because thoughts about the future provide a motive for human 
action, so his ethics can be said to include a dimension of teleology. And yet, for Lucchese, 
this is to overlook what mode of knowledge is involved in the appeal to the future, and to 
confuse what Spinoza’s denial of teleology is really aimed at. In the Appendix to Part One, 
Spinoza explains that his treatment of teleology aims to show how human beings utilize 
teleological thinking in order to explain Nature, despite Nature not according to fixed and 
final causes. To explain things in virtue of an end is a consequence of the imagination’s 
tendency to finality (Lucchese, 2020, p. 152), which has the effect of turning Nature upside 
down insofar as it seeks to explain causes by their effects (IApp). But the main issue that 
Spinoza takes up is not concerned with the power of the imagination to imagine a future 
towards which our actions are directed (a power that Spinoza argues in II17Schol should, if 
controlled, be seen as a virtue and not a vice). Rather, Spinoza wants to guard against what 
thinking of the future nearly always entails, namely, the belief in the existence of final 
causes that are seen to drive action. It is this latter point that Lucchese wants to highlight as 
Spinoza’s main concern: for Spinoza, teleology is not acting in view of an end perceived in 
the future; it is rather the giving of ontological precedence to the final cause over the 
efficient cause (Lucchese, 2020, p. 152). 
By identifying a belief in the existence of final causes as the primary prejudice of 
humanity, Spinoza highlights various other prejudices that follow from this, including the 
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belief that things are ascribed with an inherent value. As Spinoza explains, once human 
beings convinced themselves that all things were created on their account, that is to say, as 
means to their preservation and sustenance, they began to judge things according to their 
approximation to this final cause. Hence, Spinoza continues, they had to invent notions such 
as good, evil, order, confusion, beauty, ugliness, and so on (IApp), for it was via these 
notions they could rank things according to this perceived final cause. In this respect, 
Spinoza argues, things are often erroneously explained via their final cause, rather than 
from the efficient cause from which they arise. From this, it is clear that Spinoza rejects all 
forms of normative value, for to appeal to normativity is to affirm the ontological precedent 
of the effect over the final cause. As Spinoza famously notes on moral value:  
 
As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive 
in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than 
modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to 
one another. (IV Preface) 
 
Here Spinoza makes clear that the value of good or evil we confer upon things 
doesn’t so much indicate something in the object of judgement than it indicates a particular 
mode of thinking. Good and evil “indicate nothing positive in things,” which is to say, they 
do not have an existence beyond the mind that thinks them (IV Preface). Good and evil, 
according to Spinoza, are prejudices, modes of the imagination that “[…] the ignorant 
consider the chief attributes of things” (IApp). Once again, Spinoza argues for his denial of 
the intrinsic value of things by referring readers back to the central tenet of his ontology 
outlined above: there are no ends in Nature, and therefore nothing can be said to exist for 
the sake of something else, such as a final cause or universal idea. The lack of ends in Nature 
means that nothing can be said to be nearer or further from the end at which it might be 
aimed. Hence, when we make the claim ‘the dog is good,’ we only inaccurately ascribe the 
property of ‘goodness’ to the dog, for all we are really doing is naming a relation between a 
particular dog and an inadequate universal idea of what an ideal dog ought to be. Indeed, 
Spinoza is clear that when we measure things against an apparently fixed universal, we 
actually measure them against something in constant flux. Far from being a static, 
normative relation between a contingent particular and a fixed universal, the relation of 
judgement between universal and particular is highly subjective for it occurs according to 
each person’s affect (IApp). To this extent, each person’s judgement of the good will differ, 
and each person’s idea of the ideal dog will differ as much as their experience of particular 
dogs differs. It follows from this, Spinoza tells us, that only the ignorant take these affective 
relations as indicating something positive in the object of a value judgement. 
What Spinoza argues regarding the value of good and evil, so he also notes of beauty 
and ugliness, order and confusion, perfection and imperfection, and so on. Nothing can be 
judged good or evil, this or that, independently of the mind that thinks it, which is equally to 
say nothing has intrinsic value. But such an anti-normative framework doesn’t just apply to 
things but extends into the realm of affects too. In IVP43, Spinoza points out that not all 
affects that decrease an individual’s power to act — not all sad affects — are evil and, 
likewise, not all affects that increase our power to act — not all joyful affects — are good. 
Affects are never intrinsically good or bad. For instance, despite Spinoza’s initial definitions 
of pleasure and pain as affects of joy and sadness, respectively (IIIP11Schol), and thus as 
affects that are good and evil (IVP40), he continues to explain in IVP43 that pleasure and 
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pain are not good or evil unconditionally. As he puts it: “Pleasure can be excessive and evil, 
whereas pain can be good insofar as the pleasure, or joy, is evil” (IVP43). Here Spinoza 
points out that a passive affect such as pain can be good and cause an increase in a person’s 
ability to act insofar as it takes away a greater evil. Spinoza’s technical explanation of this is 
premised on how the affects of pleasure and pain affect the body (and correlatively the 
mind). As explained above, pleasure is a ‘partial affect’ that affects one part of the body 
more than the rest. If this pleasure becomes “[…] so great that it surpasses the other actions 
of the body (by P6), remains stubbornly fixed in the body, and so prevents the body from 
being capable of being affected in a great many other ways” (IVP43), then it will be 
considered evil. To the extent that such an affect has a positive effect on one part of the 
body but a negative effect on a person’s overall striving, so what is usually an affect that 
increases our power to strive becomes an affect that decreases our power to strive. Just like 
the ontology of objects that Spinoza puts forward, affects like pain and pleasure have no 
objective value and hence are not good or bad in themselves, but will only achieve such a 
value relative to a particular situation.  
Melancholy and cheerfulness, however, are fundamentally different to the general 
affects of pain and pleasure. Because melancholy and cheerfulness affect all the parts of the 
individual equally leaving no part unaffected, they are given as good or bad regardless of 
their circumstance, a claim that threatens to contradict the particularity of the affects and 
therefore Spinoza’s overall ethical relativism. According to Spinoza, then, the value of 
melancholy and cheerfulness is fixed and does not change as circumstance demands 
(IVP42), and this is because melancholy and cheerfulness are affects that affect all the parts 
of the body at once, and thus radically alter the overall striving power of the individual. But 
does the value that Spinoza attributes to melancholy and cheerfulness threaten his ethical 
relativism? By embedding the values of always good and always evil into his radically anti-
normative worldview, do melancholy and cheerfulness introduce a stasis to Spinoza’s 
system that is otherwise absent? 
One possible reading of the problematic nature of melancholy and cheerfulness is to 
turn again to how the ‘good’ is positioned in Spinoza’s philosophy. Whilst Spinoza denies the 
existence of the good ‘in’ things because of a lack of ends in Nature, he nevertheless 
chooses to retain such normative language. As he explains: 
 
But though this is so, still we must retain these words. For because we 
desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we 
may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words with the 
meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand 
by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach 
nearer and nearer to the model [exemplar] of human nature we set 
before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from 
becoming like that model. (IVPref) 
 
Here Spinoza explains that we need to retain the words ‘good’ and ‘evil’ for they 
provide structure to a particular way of living that promotes flourishing for human beings. 
But whilst he says we should retain these words, he nevertheless continues to qualify this by 
stating that we should retain them in accordance with the meaning he indicates. Hence, 
rather than taking the good to mean a universal idea or end that a particular more or less 
approximates, the good should instead be thought of as a means, thereby not prioritizing 
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the final cause over the efficient cause and avoiding the error of teleological thinking he 
cautions against. Hence, if the concept of the good traditionally indicated a final cause to 
which our striving is directed, it now indicates whatever functions as a means to our 
perseverance. The good, then, does not have any intrinsic ‘content’ but it is nevertheless 
retained as an idea so as to bring order to individual lives and direct us in the best ways of 
living.  
In a like manner to good and evil, ‘melancholy’ and ‘cheerfulness’ might also be 
understood as words that name particular affective states that have specific utility for 
human individuals’ understanding of themselves, but which nevertheless defy a clearly 
defined idea of what they ought to contain. Like the good, melancholy and cheerfulness are 
affects with no fixed content but which are nevertheless retained to describe something 
that is in constant flux but everywhere recognizable. Indeed, the ambiguity of what 
constitutes the temperament and disease of melancholy has historically led to it being seen 
as a kind of empty signifier, as that which stands in for all that is debilitating but which 
cannot be fixed or traced back to an easily identifiable and singular cause. As we have seen, 
Spinoza follows this line of thought when he states in IVP44Schol that the imagination 
struggles to perceive melancholy because of the diverse and variable causes that it involves. 
When Spinoza contrasts melancholy to the general affects that occupy the mind with only a 
single image, he suggests that melancholy entails such a multiplicity of causes that it is hard 
to conceptualize beyond its nominal definition, that is, as a thing that affects all the parts of 
the individual and that therefore always decreases an individual’s power to strive. 
Melancholy and cheerfulness, then, simply name affective states that cannot be easily 
conceptualized or imagined, but which always lead to a radical diminution or increase in an 
individual’s power. To this extent, melancholy and cheerfulness do not appear to us as a 
fixed subject with a definable set of attributes, but rather as Drew Daniel theorizes early 
modern melancholy, namely, as an assemblage.  
In his book, The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English 
Renaissance, Daniel argues that in the early modern period melancholy did not function in 
the manner of a single substance or subject-like thing that arises from a single and easily 
determinable cause but, rather, as an assemblage. As Daniel argues, melancholy should be 
understood through the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of assemblage and conceived as a 
multiplicity of extended and conceptual relations that are culturally and socially articulated 
and re-articulated.12 Because of melancholy’s complex history and multiplicity of influences, 
its singularity as a fixed universal and describable affect should, he argues, be rejected in 
favour of its positing as something dynamic and plural — as a site of multiple relations 
grounded in a material assemblage of bodies (Daniel, 2013, p. 12). The word ‘melancholy’ 
becomes, for Daniel, a mere placeholder for the multiplicity of culturally mediated ideas and 
actions whose affective mixture is at once dynamic and changeable, whilst also being 
determinate and recognizable. To this extent, melancholy does not really exist in a fixed 
material form, such as the determinable humoral substance black bile, nor does it arise out 
of the intellectual isolation of the solitary philosopher, poet, or artist. And yet, despite this 
its idea, its presence remains in and is sustained through the materiality of bodies and their 
affective relations.  
It is precisely because melancholy does not exist as a subject that, according to 
Daniel, it cannot be fixed at a particular point on the map of social ontology or intellectual 
 
12 For Deleuze and Guattari on the nature of assemblages, see Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 97–98. 
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history (Daniel, 2013, pp. 239–240). Rather, melancholy is always constituted of relations 
between bodies; as an affect that continuously tethers bodies together in an activity of 
recognition and assimilation. Indeed, even the various representations of melancholy that 
are visible in Dürer’s famous Melancholia I are less for Daniel an expression of fixed 
melancholic signs, and more about the relations between those received signs. In this 
regard, Daniel is interested less in the brooding angel herself than in the relations between 
the parts of her body, less with the angel and the objects of compass and purse than with 
the relations between the body and its surrounding objects, and less with any fixed meaning 
of Melancholia I than with the potential relations that might occur between the viewer and 
the etching (Daniel, 2013, p. 42). This latter relation between etching and viewer — the 
overall recognition and assimilation of melancholy by the viewer — is the most crucial 
relation, for it is this relation that proffers emulation and re-articulation of the diversity of 
what melancholy consists in and can be. Indeed, it is possible to say, according to Spinoza’s 
theory of the affects, that Dürer’s etching provides a site for a multiplicity of affects and 
their subsequent proliferation and sustenance via the imitation of the affects (see IIIP27). 
To think of Spinoza’s understanding of melancholy as an ‘assemblage,’ a particular 
kind of affect whose particularity and power resides in its multiplicity of causes, expressions, 
and historical representations, allows us to explain the normative language Spinoza uses to 
explain it. Just like the language of good and evil, melancholy’s normativity should be 
explained in virtue of its utility to articulate a condition that is fundamentally changeable 
and, as such, unable to be easily represented under a single and encompassing image. In the 
same way that Spinoza treats good and evil, so melancholy is retained as an affect that 
indicates any assemblage of images and affects that radically reduce one’s power to strive, 
and whose causes remain difficult to conceptualize. Here, the content of melancholy 
becomes secondary to the form that it takes, namely, a radical altering of the ratio of 
motion and rest of the individual who suffers it. Unlike pleasure and pain, whose forms can 
shift between an expression of joy and sadness, melancholy is always evil because it names 
a condition of being overwhelmed by a multiplicity of images that leads to a radical 
diminution of one’s striving power. Once again, this is just to re-iterate melancholy’s 
historical ubiquity whereby its content changes but the form it takes remains consistent: 
melancholy is everywhere agreed upon as to its harmful nature, but nowhere agreed upon 
as to its various causes or specific affective expressions. By affording melancholy a fixed 
value, Spinoza is not so much introducing normativity into his ethical theory as describing 
something that cannot be fixed on a social or ontological map, but that is nevertheless 
always recognizable in and to human beings as ‘evil.’ Melancholy is that thing which, as 
Jacques puts it, arises from many simples and is extracted from many experiences; it 
overwhelms and diminishes “absolutely” (IVP42Dem), and it is only this that makes it 
recognizable as melancholy. It is in this respect that Spinoza retains the word ‘melancholy’ 
and affords it with an objective value, for it names whatever results from an overabundance 
of images and affects and because of this is absolutely diminishing for the one who suffers 
it. For Spinoza, melancholy’s normative status does not introduce into his theory of affects a 
set of pre-given affects that are always and in every situation ‘evil,’ but rather allows for a 
description of something that is everywhere recognized but nowhere fixed. Like good and 
evil, Spinoza retains a normative language to describe melancholy and cheerfulness for it 
allows us to give a name to that which is difficult to represent under a specific image or 
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